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Abstract
The purpose of this thesis seeks to examine the origins, nature, and viability of cryptocurrencies
in the hyperinflated country of Venezuela. This inquiry first considers the emergence and
proliferation of cryptocurrencies as alternative currencies to the Venezuelan bolivar due to
breakdown of the populist economic policies of the Chavez and Maduro regimes. The economic
policies taken into consideration are the government’s overreliance on oil production, a lack of
private property institutions, disproportionate government spending, expansionary monetary
policy, draconian price controls, and an inefficient exchange rate system which all contribute to
the weakening and eventual collapse of the Venezuelan bolivar. We then shall introduce the
nature and role of cryptocurrencies in Venezuela in terms of functioning as a digital,
decentralized currency meeting Venezuelans’ preferences and demands for goods and services in
international markets in the midst of this economic crisis. This inquiry concludes by discussing
the feasibility of cryptocurrencies as alternative currencies in the hyperinflated country of
Venezuela. The scholarly debate of cryptocurrency viability materializes amongst economists
and academics like Ehrsam, Tucker, Surda, Patterson, Dorfman, and Beliunas particularly in
terms of the cryptocurrency’s ability to meet the necessary characteristics and functions of
money.
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Introduction
The current economic collapse in Venezuela is widely considered to be the greatest humanitarian
crisis of our time as Venezuelans protest their corrupt political regimes, struggle for basic
necessities like food and medicine, and fight for survival day to day. Venezuela upholds its
dominance in the news for its severe hyperinflation, high unemployment, dangerously declining
GDP, constant violence, widespread starvation, and lack of any sort of available resources.
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the GDP per capita in Venezuela has
declined by 40% over the past five years while defaulting on their foreign debt in November of
2017 (Hausmann, 2017). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) also predicts that inflation in
Venezuela will hit 650% by the end of 2017 and will hit 2300% at the end of 2018 (Zuniga,
2017). This economic collapse is fracturing the Venezuelan economy as reported in terms of
quantitative macroeconomic indicators but its collapse is chiefly affecting the individuals of
Venezuela as identified in the qualitative microeconomic conditions of its citizens. A study by
the National Survey of Living Conditions (Graham, 2017) found that the 75% of the Venezuelan
population lost an average of nineteen pounds as a result of an ongoing food shortage and lack of
basic health necessities in the country. The survey also found that 82% of Venezuelans live in
poverty with 34% of Venezuelans eating less than two meals a day. As 2018 commences, news
agencies in and around Venezuela continue to report on the increasing riots, starvation, economic
instability, and outright devastation that consumes the country (Graham, 2017).
The use of cryptocurrencies began to emerge in the late 2000s and early 2010s
internationally but most profoundly in the United States and Eurozone. It’s significant to note
that despite concentration in western developed nations, cryptocurrencies began to remarkably
propagate in Latin America particularly the country of Venezuela. Cryptocurrencies are
essentially digital currencies that require technology via mobile phone or desktop computer in
1

order to use the currency. Cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin, ripple, litecoin, and ethereum all
have a finite supply that can exist in circulation and the currencies themselves all lack a central
bank making the currency truly decentralized. These cryptocurrencies use cryptography for
security which makes it difficult to counterfeit and easily accessible across borders for
international trade or online exchanges. The big appeal regarding cryptocurrencies is that they
are organic in nature, decentralized, not susceptible to decreasing purchasing power, and
eliminate transaction fees associated with regular currencies as cryptocurrencies are not issued
by a central authority and are thus immune to government manipulation or interference. As a
direct result of the economic crisis, more and more Venezuelans are using cryptocurrencies as
tender in order to purchase basic goods that are nonexistent in their home country. According to
CNBC, there are at least a couple hundred thousand bitcoin users in Venezuela who make
roughly $500 per day (Hackett, 2017). The Venezuelan government also introduced an oilbacked cryptocurrency in late 2017 called the “Petro”, which is backed by the country’s oil
reserves, in response to the rise of alternative cryptocurrencies, severe hyperinflation in the
country, and overall economic instability particularly with regards to its foreign debt (Medium,
2018).
The purpose of this inquiry seeks to establish that the origins and development of
cryptocurrencies in Venezuela relates directly to the macroeconomic and microeconomic policies
implemented by the Chavez and Maduro regimes which have exacerbated the Venezuelan
economy and hyperinflated the Venezuelan bolivar. These policies consisted of seizing private
production of goods and services, severely controlling exports and imports, disproportionately
increasing government spending, setting draconian price controls for most goods, using an
inefficient exchange rate system, and enacting irresponsible expansionary monetary policy. This
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inquiry then seeks to establish that the result of these economic policies as denoted by poor
economic indicators forced other means of exchange i.e. cryptocurrencies to emerge into the
developing country. This inquiry then considers the costs, benefits, and functions of such
cryptocurrencies to examine the nature and role of cryptocurrencies for Venezuelans. This
inquiry concludes by discussing the feasibility of alternative currencies during hyperinflationary
economic periods. This feasibility considers the debate between Tucker, Surda, Patterson,
Durfman and Beliunas in which the cryptocurrency’s ability to take on the properties,
characteristics, and functions of money is discussed and examined.

3

Part I: The Origins of Cryptocurrencies in Venezuela
Background and Economic History of Venezuela
Venezuela is a country sitting in the northern region of South America and is one of the
most urban countries in Latin America with a population of roughly 31.5 million. Lieuwen
(2017) notes that the economy of Venezuela is built up on petroleum exports and manufacturing
where revenue from petroleum exports accounts for more than 50% of the country’s GDP and
around 95% of total exports. Venezuela is the 57th largest export country in the world and has a
positive trade balance of $6.82 billion where exports constitute $34.3 billion and imports
constitute $27.5 billion (Lieuwen, 2017). According to Simoes (2018), Venezuela’s top exports
consist of petroleum (refined and crude), precious metals, and other industrial related exports.
Simoes (2018) also cites that Venezuela is one of the largest exporters of oil in the world and has
the world’s largest proven oil reserves at around 296.5 billion barrels (20% of global oil
reserves).
Venezuela has always been a giant in the petroleum and manufacturing industries. Large
supplies of oil and abounding natural resources were discovered in Venezuela in 1922 and after
several agreements of terms with American and international oil corporations like the Standard
Oil Company and the Creole petroleum Corporation, the birth of the oil economy in Venezuela
began (Lieuwen, 2017). Following years of success due to technological advances, an increase in
automobile use, an increase in the demand for oil due to a world war and government legislation
granting more discovery for oil production, the Venezuela economy was booming (Lieuwen,
2017). In 1950 Venezuela was ranked as the world’s 4th largest wealthiest nation per capita as the
country experienced high GDP growth (roughly $7427 compared to the U.S.’ $9573)
(Desjardins, 2017). Following this period of economic height (zenith), the Organization of
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Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was created in the early 1960s to “coordinate and unify
petroleum policies among member countries in order to secure fair and stable prices for
petroleum producers; an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to consuming
nations; and a fair return on capital to those investing in the industry” (OPEC, 2018).
Due to a steady increase in demand internationally for oil and constant high prices of oil
($11.39 per barrel in 1976 dollars), the Venezuelan economy soared in the 1960s and 1970s
(Desjardins, 2017). This economic activity led to increased government revenues which the
Venezuelan government liberally spent toward public programs such as health care,
transportation, education and public subsidies (Hausmann, 2014). Hausmann (2014) also notes
that while the Venezuelan people and economy soared during periods of high oil prices ($28.95
in 1980), the economy nearly collapsed during periods of low oil prices like ($10.85 in 1986).
Hausmann (2014) continues by stating that the Venezuelan economy thus became structured
around global oil prices and so the economy contracted during shattering oil prices causing
inflation to reach unforeseen levels (84.463% in 1989) and GDP to decline rapidly (-13.9%
decline in GDP in 1989).
In 1999, Hugo Chavez came into power and initiated the “Bolivarian Revolution” as well
as a multitude of populist economic policies that were designed to help the working class, reduce
poverty and inequality, provide necessities for the poor, and establish social programs that are
designed to greatly benefit the Venezuelan people (Hausmann, 2014). These populist policies
were all possible due to booming oil prices ($24.45 per barrel) which thus resulted in booming
government revenues for Chavez and his regime. As a result of this significant increase in
revenues, Weisbrot and Sandoval (2007) note that Chavez aimed these public services to
improve Venezuelan economic and social conditions by redistributing wealth, reforming land
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use, expropriating private property, restructuring the national economy, setting price controls,
and controlling the distribution of private goods. Under Chavez, the Venezuelan economy
became even more structured around oil production as oil production accounts for 90% of
Venezuelan exports currently (Hausmann, 2014). During the Chavez years, the central
government’s social spending increased from 8.2 percent of GDP in 1999 to 13.6 percent in
2006, in real inflation terms the social spending per person has increased by 170% in a duration
of eight years (Weisbrot and Sandoval, 2007).
Following the death of Chavez in March of 2013, Maduro and his administration quickly
took control and strictly adhered to the tenets of Chavez’ Bolivarian revolution and populist
economic policies (Rosati and Zarpa, 2017). Maduro was hostile to foreign businesses as
government authorities seized factories and private property which forced private corporations
like GM, United, and PepsiCo to leave Venezuela (Zuniga, 2016). Maduro continually increased
wages for the working class and Maduro kept the overvalued exchange rate in place and resumed
the government control of the economy as oil production/exportation both defined and destroyed
the economy (Benzaquen, 2017). All was meagerly well up until international oil prices fell
drastically in 2014, from $110 to $48 per barrel, and suddenly the government was exponentially
growing its deficit (Benzaquen, 2017). As a solution, Maduro decided to print more currency to
cover the bill. This lead to excessively high volatility and an exponential acceleration of the
inflation rate.
Venezuela’s economy is currently in turmoil as inflation rates soar out of control as the
International Monetary Funds (IMF) indicates that the inflation rate at the end of 2018 could rise
as high as 2300%, a rate so high not seen since Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation crisis in the 2000s
when inflation hit an unbelievable 79,600,000,000% (Durden, 2017). In the past four years
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Venezuela’s GDP has decreased by 35% while their GDP in terms of per capita has decreased by
40% meaning that their entire economy from a macroeconomic scope has decreased by more
than a third in size which is a greater contraction than the U.S. great Depression where GDP
decreased by 28% (Hausmann, 2017). Not only is this affecting the macroeconomic scope of the
country but it is affecting and hurting the Venezuelan people the most. Venezuela’s economy
also ranks among the lowest in terms of property rights and economic freedom according to
Heritage (2017) as the country ranks 179 out of 180 countries, just in front of the dictatorship of
North Korea. Venezuelans are unemployed, starving, rioting, and demanding economic and
social justice as Venezuelans young and old struggle to survive. In a study, the National Survey
of Living Conditions (2017) found that roughly 75% of Venezuelans have lost an average of 19
pounds since the birth of the Venezuelan collapse while 34% eat less than two meals a day. This
period of hyperinflation declining GDP, and outright starvation means an inability for
Venezuelans to participate in the labor market and an inability use Venezuelan currency (the
bolivar) to purchase goods like basic necessities that are in short supply.

7

Economic Policies and Effects of Chavez and Maduro
While Venezuela’s demise started back in the early 20th century, several policies
implemented by the Chavez and Maduro regimes continue to exacerbate the economy and
negatively affect the Venezuelan people. It’s important to note that several other factors helped
contribute to the demise of Venezuela (foreign conflicts, foreign intervention, internal
corruption, etc.) although the economic policies set forth by these regimes significantly affected
the need for alternative currencies to arise. Macroeconomists Dornbusch (1989), Edwards
(1999), Rodriguez (2018), and Hausmann (2017) all discuss the repercussions of populist
economic policies particularly in terms of how they have affected countries within the Latin
America continent. The first economic policy considered is the restructuring of the Venezuelan
economy as the government continues to severely structure its economy and excessively control
imports and exports. The second economic policy considered is the redistribution of wealth and
land providing an unsatisfactory business environment for corporations as well as families. The
third economic policy considered is the irresponsible government spending followed and lack of
savings which failed to allow for any revenues during contractionary economic periods. The
fourth economic policy considered is their unfortunate use of price controls that fail to alleviate
the bill for consumers as shortages proliferate. The final economic policy considered is the
unfortunate monetary policy that the Venezuelan government has undertaken which has
absolutely altered the Venezuelan economy. These economic policies that have been advanced
by the Chavez and Maduro regimes have plagued the Venezuelan economy and have forced
cryptocurrency markets to emerge and be a viable alternative currency in an era of hyperinflation
and economic instability.
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The fatal flaw of the Venezuelan economy is the over-reliance on the production of oil
which is expected to be the engine of economic growth. In Chavez’ 1999 constitution, Chavez
heavily focused on running the state ownership of PDVSA (Petroleos of Venezuela, S.A.) like a
private firm, the largest state-run oil company in Venezuela, as well as maximizing revenues (not
profits) (Reuters, 2010,) .In 2006, Chavez announced a nationalization of oil production
managed by foreign companies which thus resulted in an increase in of the government’s shares
in these projects from 40% to 60% prompting many companies like Exxon Mobil and
ConocoPhillips to leave the region entirely (Reuters, 2010). At the start of Chavez’ term in 1999,
petroleum products as a percentage of total goods exported was roughly 68.78% but due to an
increase in state intervention, this figure has increased to 96.28% (Hausmann, 2014).
Following a strike of oil workers in Venezuela in 2002, Chavez fired all oil workers
(roughly 17,000) and replaced experienced, qualified oil technicians and workers with
unqualified loyal followers of Chavez which signaled a significant drop in GDP from 2002 to
2003 this is referred to as Chavez’ renationalization of PDVSA (Reuters, 2010). Chavez also met
with the OPEC regularly and actively fought for production quotas and limiting supply in order
to maintain steady international prices thus allowing for a steady Venezuelan economy (Reuters,
2010). This renationalization allowed Chavez to fully control PDVSA which focused prior on
mass producing barrels of oil, regardless of any OPEC quotas but Chavez wanted to maintain a
steady price of a barrel of oil from $22 to $28 dollars and thus renationalization allowed his
policies to truly control the state production of oil (Hanson and Alvarez, 2009).
While Chavez had good intentions in terms of increasing government revenue by relying
on their powerhouse of an industry, oil production, its flaw is its failure to diversify its
investments, exports, and entire economy as a whole. Because oil account for 95% of
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Venezuela’s export earnings and half of it budget revenue, Venezuela is unfortunately dependent
upon a factor largely outside its control that is, the international price of oil. This is known as the
Dutch Disease which ultimately refers to the negative consequences arising from large increases
of the value of a country’s currency associated heavily with focusing on a particular natural
resources (C.W., 2014). The Dutch Disease causes a decrease in the price competitiveness for
exports in the affected country’s manufactured goods while increasing the quantity of imports
resulting from an appreciated currency (Heath, 2016). This appreciated currency hurts exports of
manufacturing and other industrial sectors. This sudden increase in oil production restricted
Venezuela’s overall ability to create, invest and maintain other industries necessary for the
overall economy (Schwartz, 2016). Schwartz (2016) notes that the overreliance on oil production
tends to eliminate other industries due to a lack of investment and an appreciated which accounts
for goods being cheaper abroad. Venezuela used to have quite a diverse economy consisting of
agriculture, industry, and horticulture but now they rely on imports for 80% of its food sources
and food production accounts for as little as 4% of GDP (Hausmann, 2014). From 1990-1999
Venezuela’s industrial production declined from 50 percent to 24 percent of GDP (Hausmann,
2014). This overreliance on oil production as a result of centralized planning in one industry
forces the economy as a whole to be susceptible to the boom and bust business cycle and oil
prices which thus forces irregular shifts in the country’s GDP as can be seen by the 7% decrease
in GDP from 2013 to 2014 (Hausmann, 2017). The government thus survives only based on the
revenues from this one resource which considering the unstable and volatile international price
of oil, one can expect irregular and volatile government revenues.
The implementation of redistributive land and wealth policies have also been detrimental
to the Venezuelan economy and contributed to the emergence of alternative currencies. Property
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rights are essential to a flourishing economy as noted in Adam Smith’s An Inquiry into the
Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776). Property rights are imperative for economic
development due to their basis for economic exchange, trade, and the development of markets
both markets for goods and financial markets. Property rights that are legally defined allow for
individuals to commit resources to ventures and activities with full confidence allowing for
investment and greater economic activity to occur without threat or fear of theft or confiscation
(Alchian, 2007). Private property provides an incentive to conserve finite resources and maintain
capital for future production and thus allowing individuals to exchange allowing individuals to
make trades that will make both parties better off. (Alchian, 2007) Private property is essential to
economic development and the regimes of Chavez and Maduro have destroyed this essential
tenet for economic prosperity.
In 2001, Chavez initiated a land law that allowed the Venezuelan government to
confiscate privately owned land that the government deemed as either idle, unproductive or not
for appropriate use (Weisbrot and Sandoval, 2007). In 2005, Chavez took hold of hundreds of
thousands of acres of land owned by private firms and individuals forcing an emergence of an
uninviting and dis-incentivizing individuals to participate in the market economy (Weisbrot and
Sandoval, 2007). Chavez’ re-election in 2006 was based on seizing the means of production,
private assets which since then have been constantly under harassment by the regime (Taub,
2017). Chavez also advocated an amended the Venezuelan constitution in 2007 to allow for
public property and communal property in which he nationalized many industries and sectors of
the economy (Taub, 2017). In 2015, Maduro began seizing assets, firms, and individuals who
Maduro deemed weren’t fully transparent with the Venezuelan government (Krauss, 2017). As a
result, the government seized seventeen businesses who weren’t in line with the government,
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thirty-five supermarkets, seventeen owners/shareholders who were in violation of not acting
within the government’s jurisdiction (Krauss, 2017). Venezuela currently ranks 127 out of 131 in
terms of property rights according to the International Property Rights Index (2017).
These redistributive policies have been absolutely disastrous for business, corporations,
and individuals who are employed and derive income and capital from their productive behavior
with these firms. In May of 2017, General Motors shut its operations after the Venezuelan
government seized its plant following Ford Motors departure in December of 2016 (Krauss,
2017). Several other companies have left the country citing economic instability and an
economic environment that is bad for business, companies like Pepsi, Coca-Cola, Bridgestone,
Colgate, Kimberly Clark, Mondelez, and ExxonMobil (Krauss, 2017). CNBC cites that in late
2015, Pepsi left the country of Venezuela due to sheer fear of government seizing its assets and
fear of an even more unwelcoming economic future and so Pepsi left Venezuela taking on a $1.4
billion dollar loss (Fahey and Wells, 2016). Without solidly defined property rights, the
Venezuelan economy will continue to collapse and the economic incentive and price system that
allows for economic growth and economic development.
Price controls are another component to the deterioration of the Venezuelan economy and
the emergence of other currencies being used for medium of exchanges. Price controls are
essentially government regulation establishing a maximum price to be charged for specific goods
and services that is used often during war and inflation. In a free market, the market price is the
price of a good or service in which the quantity supplied is equivalent to the quantity demanded.
This market-clearing price is ideal as the market clears due to a lack of shortages or surpluses
adhering to the law of supply and law of demand; it’s an indication of the relative scarcity of a
commodity and rations it to the highest demander in an economy. These market prices satisfy
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both the needs of suppliers and demanders and by engaging in a particular trade both parties are
better off. These prices function as signals to both consumers and producers of how much of a
product or service must be demanded or supplied respectively.
The price controls set in place by the Venezuelan government have completely disrupted
the Venezuelan economy and have distorted the price system. In 2014, the Maduro Regime
initiated the Fair Prices Act which banned profit margins over 30% and tightened price ceilings
on basic goods (Reuters, 2014). This Fair prices Act is Maduro’s attempt to combat inflation by
imprisoning those hoarding goods or “over-charging” government guidelines. The Maduro
regime has also implemented a policy titled CLAPS which is a government redistributive effort
to distribute food from house to house which attempts to better supply goods to those who are in
desperate need (Reuters, 2014). In June of 2016, Maduro put the Defense Minister Vladimir
Padrino Lopez in charge of product distribution and price controls due to mass attempts of
looting in urban areas and as a result the military hoarded products, were involved in heavy
corruption and significantly increased the cost of goods (Gillespie, 2017). All in all, the
Venezuelan government set price controls on 400 basic foods to counter inflation and to protect
the poor and set minimum production quotas for roughly the same goods which in turn led to
higher inflation rates and caused more shortages which hurt those already impoverished
(Gillespie, 2017).
In theory, price controls seem like a great idea as they help decrease the prices of goods
(set a ceiling, suppliers can’t price above) and as such more people can purchase the good or
service. However, price controls are great in theory but in practice they cause more harm than
they do good. In practice, the price-fixing done by the Venezuelan government has destroyed the
clearing and allocating function of market prices. As a result, short-run surpluses or shortages
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become inevitable due to excess supply or excess demand as well as price increases in selected
markets for similar goods, the creation of dangerous black markets for akin goods, and a
continuous misallocation of scarce economic resources. Price controls have hurt the Venezuelan
as can be seen by the constant shortages and long lines seen in Venezuelan supermarkets and the
report from the National Survey of Living Conditions (2017) reporting a nineteen-pound
decrease in weight for the average Venezuelan since the start of the Venezuelan crisis and a lack
of ability to obtain three meals per day. From the implemented price control policy, the
government and military benefit the most while the consumers are of the most negatively
affected.
Another significant cause of the Venezuelan crisis is the reckless government spending
and corresponding monetary policy that relates earlier to the overreliance on oil production. Due
to Venezuela’s structured economy that relies on oil production or 95% of economic output, the
majority of revenues coming into the hands of Chavez and Maduro come from oil revenues
(Hausmann, 2014). However, as discussed earlier, the revenues attributed to the Venezuelan are
dependent upon oil prices and thus the revenues act as a function of international oil prices.
Logically assuming ceteris paribus, when international oil prices are high – government revenues
are high, and when international oil prices are low – government revenues are low. In the
beginning of 2014 international oil prices were as high as $100 per barrel but fast forward two
years ahead and international oil prices are around $26 per barrel – a decrease of government
revenues of around 75% (Reuters, 2010).
During the oil boom, Chavez increased government spending was possible due an
increase in the influx of government revenues via increased international prices of oil
(Hausmann, 2014). In 2009, Chavez increased government spending to $16 billion from $5.6
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billion while increasing the minimum wage by 20% and increasing taxes particularly a sales tax
from 9% to 12% (Hausmann, 2014). At the peak of oil prices in 2008 ($147.30 per barrel),
Chavez built a series of social programs based on the revenue earned from these high oil prices
rather than keep the revenues on reserve for contractionary economic periods (i.e. the 2014
crisis) (Hausmann, 2014). While emphasizing social programs and lacking any savings for
periods of economic recession, the Venezuelan economy has set itself up for disaster as seen in
its current debt crisis. This drop in oil prices causes a limited access to foreign currency (the U.S.
dollar), aggravates inflation, created huge shortages, limits imports, and causes the debt to
increase (Hausmann, 2014).
Economist Garcia cites that the Venezuelan monetary base has increased by 1000 percent
annually as a way to cover its large budget deficit that is, the amount of total money in
circulation is increasing by 1000% every year (Reuters, 2017). At the end of 2016, Venezuelan
President Nicolas Maduro also unveiled new Bolivar w/ denominations of 100,000, 20,000,
10,000, 5,000, 2,000, 1,000, and 500 eliminating the use of small denominated bills (Reuters,
2017). This mass production of currency is the Maduro regime’s attempt to cover its deficits but
has only increased hyperinflation to a projected high of 2300% in 2018, an inflation unforeseen
in modern Latin American history (Hausmann, 2014).
The final component to the collapse of the Venezuelan economy is their currency
controls and their exchange rate fixing. In January 2003, the Chavez regime implemented strict
currency controls which made it more difficult for investors to exchange bolivars for dollars
(Bajpai, 2015). The government created CADIVI which is a currency control board charged with
handling foreign exchange procedures. At the same time, the Venezuelan government suspended
trading of the bolivar as it continuously plummeted in value (Disilvestro and Howden, 2016).
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This was an attempt by the Chavez regime to protect Venezuela’s foreign reserves by setting a
fixed rate for the dollar, to prevent capital flight, and maintain the stability of the bolivar after
several oil strikes and as a result, there were a series of devaluations disrupting the
macroeconomic stability of the country (Disilvestro and Howden, 2016). Disilvestro and
Howden (2016) note that the Chavez regime also introduced several exchange rates: CENCOEX
for the importation of food and shortages (6.30 bolivars to the dollar), SICAD I (12 bolivars per
dollar), SICAD II (50 bolivars per dollar) which like SICARD I assigns dollars to enterprises that
import all other types of goods, SIMDAI is the last exchange rate and this rate is reserved for the
purchase and sale of foreign currency to individuals and businesses (200 bolivars per dollar).
A direct result of this economic policy is that the Venezuelan government will have direct
say over who gets U.S. dollars and who doesn’t. At the time of the implementation of the policy,
the exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and Venezuelan Bolivar was 1.6 but ten years with
constant government intervention and currency controlling policies, the exchange rate is roughly
172 bolivars for every U.S. dollar which is a devaluation of about 99% (Disilvestro and Howden,
2016). When looking at the black market, the exchange rate is nearly 900 bolivars to the U.S.
dollar (Disilvestro and Howden, 2016). This massive devaluation is detrimental for consumers
who must deal with high degrees of price inflation and for businesses that must undergo longterm capital planning decisions with a constantly changing monetary unit (Disilvestro and
Howden, 2016). This massive volatility of the exchange rate caused by the government’s
currency restrictions and exchange rates will deter any sort of participation by consumers,
investment by businesses, and trade amongst parties, and will further lead to economic instability
(Disilvestro and Howden, 2016).
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The complex exchange rate system allows for limited exchanges to occur due to the
difficulty to actually get assigned these rates by the bureaucracy and thus Venezuelans must rely
on the black market to meet their demands for foreign currency which is obviously much less
advantageous at 900 bolivars versus 6.3-200 on the government regulated market but more
reliable to meet their demands for foreign currency exchange (Disilvestro and Howden, 2016).
The corruption involved also plays a huge role as officials within the government benefit the
most from this mismanagement of money as they can obtain U.S. dollars through legal channels
(low prices) but then sell them on the black market for a higher price, the definition of arbitrage
(Disilvestro and Howden, 2016). Due to the stability, strength, and relativity high value of the
U.S. dollar, embezzling also occurring which is preventing any sort of importation of basic
goods which leads to unpaid imports, business owners with no options to import goods, foreign
exchange shortages, and shortages of goods hurting consumers in Venezuela (Disilvestro and
Howden, 2016). This complex and inappropriate exchange rate system allowed for the blackmarket rate to proliferate since Venezuelan business owners rely on foreign goods that require
payments with reliable foreign currencies (Disilvestro and Howden, 2016). Due to the
government’s holding of reliable currencies, Venezuelans must resort to the black market and as
such raise the merchant’s price on consumers (Disilvestro and Howden, 2016). Due to the price
controls already in place as discussed earlier, businesses make little profit due to this and as such,
shortages proliferate due to the inability to import the goods that Venezuela is so heavily reliant
on. By using the black market rate, businesses in the Venezuela economy will have no way to
maintain stable prices for the products the import which represents a huge disruption of the
market (Sanchez and Goodman, 2014). A great example of this is Venezuela’s largest food
supplier, Empresas Polar, which owes 463 million U.S. dollars to foreign suppliers (Sanchez and
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Goodman, 2014). The most recent study back in 2014 focused on the significance of shortages in
the country of Venezuela and the study revealed that 22.4% of necessary goods are not in stock
(Sanchez and Goodman, 2014). In summary, shortages, high inflation, and further devaluation of
the bolivar are the direct result of these exchange rate policies (Sanchez and Goodman, 2014).
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The Venezuelan Economic Crisis
It is clear: the Venezuelan economy is crashing and the macroeconomic and
microeconomic policies implemented by Chavez and Maduro have played a huge role in its
exacerbation as well as the emergence of cryptocurrencies in Venezuela. The government has
restructured its economy to focus solely on oil revenue and due to the nationalization of oil
corporations and production, the economy has just become inefficient and unfortunately has
become over-reliant and susceptible to the international price of oil. The redistributive land and
wealth pieces of legislature have destroyed the incentive system and one of the essential
institutions for the propensity for economic growth. The price control populist policies have
distorted the price system and have furthered hyperinflation and led to widespread shortages. The
government spending and in turn, monetary policy to cover the deficits, implemented by the
Chavez and Maduro regimes have severely increased the inflation rate and distorted the imports
entering the country and in turn have caused shortages. The final component is the currency
controls and fixed exchange rates which have turned to more government corruption,
inefficiency, increased inflation, and shortages.
These populist policies of import and export construction, redistribution of wealth,
massive government spending, monetary policy, price controlling, currency controlling, and
exchange rate controlling have all poor economic effects and the economic indicators in
Venezuela all tell the same story of high inflation, massive shortages, starvation, political
turmoil, a devalued currency, economic inefficiency, and overall economic instability. The story
is that Venezuela is experiencing inflation as high as 2300%, GDP has decreased by almost ½
over the past five years, and the government has enacted and continues to ratify unfavorable
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economic policies that hurt consumers, business owners, and domestic companies, as well as
foreign entities.
Due to the economic instability, there are a few options or paths to try and resolve this
economic crisis but the “correct” solution is quite up to debate. One of economist Francisco R.
Rodriguez argues that the simple step would be to eliminate Venezuela’s huge budget deficit as
the government would get more local currency for every barrel of oil sold (Rodriguez, 2016).
Rodriguez (2016) argues that this attempt would help lower inflation because there would be no
need to print excess bolivars in order to operate as a state and importers would no longer feel the
urge to attain cheap dollars and instead would buy imported goods which would assist the
economy tremendously. Another economist, Ricardo Hausmann (2017), who often disagrees
with economist Rodriguez, agrees with Rodriguez that the unification of exchange rates would
be an important step in economic reform for Venezuela and due to the extreme exchange rate
differential, that currently exists.
The answer to the Venezuelan crisis is not simple but there are several ways governments
or independent central banks (not present in the case of Venezuela) can help deter hyperinflation
whether it be through contractionary monetary policy by reducing the monetary supply by
reducing bond prices and increasing interest rates, increasing reserve requirements on the amount
of money banks are legally required to hold on hand for withdrawals, or by directly/indirectly
reducing the money supply by engaging in policies to reduce the money supply (exchange rate
stabilization or monetary stabilization). Periods of hyperinflations have existed in the past
century with examples including Germany in the early 1920s, Hungary after world war two in
the 1940s, Chile in the 1980s, Argentina in the 1980s, Ecuador in the 2000s, and Zimbabwe in
the late 2000s. For the majority of these countries in severe economic turmoil akin to Venezuela
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(Germany, Ecuador, Argentina, and Zimbabwe), currency substitution or pegging a currency on
the gold standard or dollarization has been perhaps the most credible solution. Currency
substitutions are essentially the use of a foreign currency either with or instead of a domestic
currency and have historically been used in attempts to resolve cases of hyperinflations
(Amadeo, 2018).
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Part II: The Nature of Bitcoins in Venezuela
Alternative Currencies
While the Venezuelan government continues to struggle on resolving its debt crisis,
economic inefficiencies, and outright economic turmoil, more and more Venezuelans are turning
to alternative currencies in the short run instead of its national currency (Chun, 2017). The
bolivar, the currency of Venezuela, is extremely hyperinflated and lacks any sort of functionality
as either a medium of exchange, unit of account, or store of value in this economy. The bolivar,
as a result of the macroeconomic and microeconomic policies stated above, has become useless
as a currency. A great example of the massive devaluation can be seen in the following example.
At the start of 2017, 3,100 bolivars were needed to buy 1 U.S. Dollar (Gillsepie, 2017). On
November 1 2017, 41,000 bolivars were needed to buy 1 U.S. dollar and on November 21, 2017
84,000 bolivars were needed to buy 1 U.S. Dollar (Gillespie, 2017). The IMF in turn suggests
that in 2018, the inflation rate in Venezuela will hit roughly 2300% while many Venezuelans
struggle to make ends meet and buy basic goods (Gillespie, 2017). Many international news
agencies in and around Venezuela are reporting that many shopkeepers have been forced to
weigh wads of cash instead of counting the individual bills due to the multitude of dollars needed
to buy basic goods (England, 2017). The Independent (2017) reports that Venezuelans have been
stuffing huge volumes of cash in handbags, money belts, and backpacks as way to buy goods in
the market. This hyperinflation that Venezuela is experiencing has completely destroyed the
purchasing power of the bolivar (PPM), making the purchasing power of an individual using the
national currency almost worthless.
While the Venezuelan government continues to preserve and implement populist policies
that have been seen to hurt the economy and individuals within the economy, Venezuelans need
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access to goods, necessities, and services to properly live their lives and survive. It’s clear that
the Bolivar cannot access as a medium of exchange, a store of value, and a unit of account – the
necessary properties of money. Money is necessary as it used to intermediate the exchange of
goods and services as it is more efficient than a barter system which suffers for the indivisibility
problem, double coincidence of wants problem, and inadequately fails to maximize welfare
derived from trading and exchanging goods.
In his famous piece, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations
(1776), Adam Smith writes on the importance of money in that “No society can surely be
flourishing and happy, of which the greater part of the members are poor and miserable. It is but
equity, besides, that who they feed, clothe, and lodge the whole body of the people, should have
such a share of the produce of their own labour as to be themselves tolerably well fed, clothed,
and lodged.” Adam Smith argues here that when too many people don’t have functioning money
or lack thereof, that there cannot be a flourishing society. This is the epitome of what is
occurring in Venezuela as Venezuelans struggle and suffer from a lack of a stable and sound
monetary system and economy for that matter. In an economy, with an impaired monetary
system and an economy that fails to have a functioning currency, employ labor capital, provide
incomes to citizens, and supply goods at the market for proper exchange, ulterior methods must
be employed. This is the case for an alternative currencies.
As a result of this economic turmoil, more and more Venezuelans are turning toward
alternative, decentralized currencies that aren’t regulated by the state (Chun, 2017). By
definition, alternative currencies are “currencies that are used in conjunction with national
currencies but are typically not legal tender and not printed or regulated by the government entity
in which the currency is used” (Schwartz, 2008). Alternative currencies typically exist outside
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the realm of monetary policy and tend to be decentralized. In Venezuela, the use of alternative
currencies has skyrocketed simply due to the failure of the national currency and the need for a
proper currency to act as a medium of exchange, a store of value, and a unit of account. Peter
North (2008) at the University of Liverpool notes that “when money gets dried up and there are
still needs to be met in society, people come up with creative ways to meet those needs.” One of
the biggest alternative cryptocurrencies both in Venezuela and globally, is the cryptocurrency
Bitcoin.
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Cryptocurrencies Background and History
Cryptocurrencies are digital assets that are designed to work as a medium of exchange
which uses cryptography to secure its transactions, to control the creation of additional units, and
to verify the transfer of such digital assets (Martucci, 2017). Modern examples of
cryptocurrencies that are currently in existence are Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, Ripple, Coinye,
and many others. The cryptocurrency’s block chain is the master ledger which stores and records
all prior transactions and activity, validating ownership of all the units of currency at any given
time (Martucci, 2017). It’s important to note that cryptocurrencies are not regulated by a national
government or entity as the control is decentralized due to supply and value for the assets being
derived from the activity of the users and the very complex protocols involved with the
governing coding. The supply of bitcoin units is decentralized and is derived from a finite supply
which the source codes outline the precise number of units that can be mined and that can exist
in circulation and as it reaches the finite supply, new units of currency units cannot be minted
(Martucci, 2017).
The supply of cryptocurrencies relates to the work of what is called cryptocurrency
miners. Cryptocurrency miners serve as record keepers for cryptocurrency transactions and are
indirect arbiters of the value of cryptocurrencies (Martucci, 2017). Miners use very large
amounts of computing power (electrical energy) to verify the completeness, accuracy, precision,
and security of cryptocurrencies’ block chain (Martucci, 2017). The large amounts of energy are
required in order to solve complex mathematical puzzles/problems which is performed by high
powered computers thus the high energy is required for its self-sustaining character. The term
miner refers to the fact that miners work to literally create wealth in the form of brand new
cryptocurrency units. Every newly created block chain copy comes with a two-part monetary

25

reward that is, a fixed number of newly minted cryptocurrency units and a variable number of
existing units collected from optional transaction fees paid by buyers (Martucci, 2017).
Cryptocurrency mining is a potentially lucrative side business for those with the resources to
invest in power and hardware intensive mining operations. Mining, which is not a difficult
process to undertake technologically in terms of costs or technical knowledge, periodically
produces new cryptocurrency units and most cryptocurrencies are designed to have a finite
supply and thus as time progresses miners will mine fewer new units per new block chain
(Martucci, 2017).
Cryptocurrencies aren’t just a twenty-first century phenomenon. Brian Martucci (2017)
cites that cryptocurrencies have existed as theoretical constructs long before the first digital
alternative currencies debuted in the late 2000s and early 2010s. Martucci (2017) notes that the
intention of cryptocurrency proponents was to share the goal of applying advanced mathematical
and computer science principles to “solve” practical and political shortcomings of fiat currencies.
Cryptocurrency’s technical foundations date back to the early 1980s when an American
cryptographer, David Chaum, constructed a “blinding” algorithm that remains central to modern
wed-based encryption. This “blinded money” algorithm allowed for secure, unalterable
information exchanges between parties, laying the foundation for future electronic currency
transfers (Martucci, 2017). After commercialization of the blinded money concept, several
cryptocurrency-lite currencies emerged like DigiCash in the 1980s, b-money and Bit Gold in the
1990s, and e-gold in the 1990s (Martucci, 2017). These cryptocurrencies all started with very
promising potential however for a variety of reasons (lack of investment, lack of security, and
limited trading deals), these cryptocurrencies all faded out and never gained traction in the
market economy.
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Bitcoin is arguably the first modern cryptocurrency to be used publicly as a medium of
exchange including decentralized control, user anonymity, record-keeping via the block chain,
and built in scarcity. Following the global economic recession in 2007 and 2008, a Satoshi
Nakamoto, a pseudonym, released Bitcoin to the public and in 2010 the cryptocurrency was
values for the first time as the first transaction of two pizzas for 10,000 bitcoins took place
(Cove, 2017). Bitcoin is simply a cryptocurrency that can be used as a medium of exchange for
other currencies, products, and services. Every cryptocurrency holder has a private key that
authenticates their identity and allows them to exchange units. These cryptocurrency users also
have “wallets” stored in the cloud with unique information that confirms them as the temporary
owners of their bitcoin units (Cove, 2017). According to Metcalfe’s Law, the inherent value of
the Bitcoin network grows exponentially as more users participate in it (Durden, 2017). For
example, in March of 2010, 1 bitcoin could buy you .003 of a U.S. dollar but in December of
2017, 1 bitcoin could buy you 17,900 U.S. dollars (Durden, 2017). While the value of Bitcoin
continues to generally increase, its prices are unstable and dangerously volatile. Bitcoin has a
tendency to go through various appreciation and depreciation cycles that seem related to bubbles
and busts of the business cycle as can be seen on December 22, 2017 Bitcoin lost a third of its
value in 24 hours as its price fell below $14,000 (Durden, 2017). Bitcoin currently has a price of
around $11564.38 (Durden, 2017).
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Bitcoins in Venezuela
While Bitcoin, and most other cryptocurrencies for that matter, originated and have been
used mostly in the United States of America and Eurozone, Bitcoins have been exploding
recently in other markets but none more so than Venezuela (Chun, 2017). The use of
cryptocurrencies in Venezuela have skyrocketed in recent years. Joseph Young (2017) found that
in a three-month period (June 2017 to September 2017) that the trading volume of LocalBitcoins,
an exchange system for bitcoins, had quadrupled from 9 billion bolivars to 40 billion bolivars.
The number of Venezuelans using cryptocurrencies is unknown from government economic data
due to the government ultimately ruling that the use and mining of operations of bitcoin are
outright illegal. However, according to Bitcoin, Bitcoin trading numbers in Venezuela have
soared from $225,000 at the beginning of 2017 to approximately $2.1 million (Armario and
Sanchez, 2017). Joshua Althauser (2017) notes that Bitcoin is becoming a constant part of many
Venezuelans’ everyday life and cites that Bitcoin is now a common mode of payment for many
Venezuelans whether they are buying food, plane tickets, or even paying employees.
Cryptocurrencies can be seen in the developed world as a means for investment and not so much
as a means of exchange but Althauser argues that for Venezuelan, these cryptocurrencies allow
for access to goods and services in new markets which thus means survival
One Venezuelan, John Villar, cites that the national currency has become worthless and
thus sticks with bitcoin for all of his transactions (Armario and Sanchez, 2017). John Villar states
that thousands of ordinary Venezuelans are turning to the world of cryptocurrency to salvage
what’s left in their savings and that it’s a matter of survival, not politics (Armario and Sanchez,
2017). He also notes how easy it is as anyone with a smartphone can access websites like
LocalBitcoin or Colibit which act as exchanges to buy and sell bitcoins using a local bank
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account (Armario and Sanchez, 2017). Rafael, a Venezuelan, uses bitcoin to import goods that
are no longer available in Venezuela and resupply his store’s shelves (Althauser, 2017).
Fernando, another Venezuelan, is a bitcoin miner who uses the monthly revenue to buy insulin
and other medical supplies from overseas (Armario and Sanchez, 2017). David, another
Venezuelan, imports basic staples from a Miami based courier service and uses amazon gift
cards as a means of exchange which he buys with bitcoins (Althauser, 2017).
This kind of financial activity and exchange with bitcoins in Venezuela is a common
occurrence. Colibit founder Rafael Useche cites that Venezuelans are taking refuge in digital
currencies (Armario and Sanchez, 2017). One of the significant components that makes mining
bitcoin so easily accessible is that the Maduro regime heavily subsidizes electricity and thus this
virtually free resource can be used by individuals in Venezuela to mine bitcoin with very little
transaction cost. Althauser (2017) notes that basic mining in Venezuela for struggling citizens
can earn roughly $500 a month which is enough to feed a family and provide basic needs like
household goods, food, and medications. Bitcoin ultimately allows users in Venezuela to import
food, medicine, and other goods through e-commerce sites like Amazon, Walmart, and many
others thus circumventing the capital controls and policies that made it impossible for
Venezuelans to purchase foreign goods with the Venezuelan bolivar. The Venezuelan
government has already set up policies and actions to deter this cryptocurrency emergence by
having police arrest any bitcoin or other cryptocurrency miners (Young, 2017).
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Characteristics of Cryptocurrencies
Unofficial reports project that roughly a couple hundred thousand Venezuelans are
actively using Bitcoins as a medium of exchange (Aru, 2017). In the America Quarterly Report,
Ehrsam (2015) notes that the early impact of Bitcoin will be greatest in markets where it
“enables opportunities not possible within the framework of existing alternatives.” Ehrsam
(2015) also argues that in developing countries, “Bitcoin provides the necessary infrastructure to
enable more efficient remittances, a hedge against inflationary economies and a low-cost way to
boost financial inclusion”.
In terms of monetary theory, cryptocurrencies are ultimately hardwired for scarcity
meaning that there is a finite supply of currency for the population to use (Acheson, 2018).
Bitcoin is not regulated by a central bank like the central bank in Venezuela or the Federal
Reserve in the United States and thus is a total decentralized currency. This kind of currency has
absolutely zero risk of policy-induced hyperinflation as seen earlier with the Chavez and Maduro
regimes’ macroeconomic and microeconomic policies all affecting the purchasing power of the
bolivar and leading to the hyperinflation crisis today. Cryptocurrencies, Bitcoin for example, are
different. Bitcoins aren’t regulated by a central authority and thus aren’t functions of monetary
policy and aren’t related to the individual health of an economy. Bitcoins have a maximum
supply of 21 million bitcoin units where 14 million units are currently in supply (Acheson,
2018). In cryptocurrency theory, the number of bitcoins generated per block decreases by half or
roughly decreases every four years (Acheson, 2017). The present value of bitcoins or
cryptocurrencies for that matter is derived by individuals buying and selling in a global, open
marketplace. Cryptocurrencies are also digital assets and so can be divisible into much smaller
units than any other fiat currency thus enabling new types of commerce such as real time pricing
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of low cost utilities (Acheson, 2018). It’s important to note that cryptocurrencies offer a reliable
means of exchange outside the direct control of national banks as central banks participating in
quantitative easing (central banks printing money by purchasing government bonds) or near zero
interbank lending rates (Acheson, 2018). In the long run, many economists, political scientists
and even the International Monetary Fund (IMF) plans on incorporating some aspects of
cryptocurrencies to fiat currencies (Hackett, 2017).
While a decentralized international currency that is not regulated can be seen as unsecure,
dangerous, or manipulative, the mining process acts as a way to incentivize quality control,
security, and privacy of its transactions on its blockchains and of its participating individuals
(Golman, 2018). Mining is a built-in quality control and policing mechanism for
cryptocurrencies as miners are incentivized and paid for their efforts (Golman, 2018). These
miners have a financial stake in keeping accurate, up-to-date transaction records thus keeping the
integrity and the value of the currency (Golman, 2018). The up to date transactions al occur on
the blockchain which acts as a digitized, decentralized, public ledger of all cryptocurrency
transactions. This blockchain allows market participants to keep track of digital currency
transactions without central recordkeeping (Bauerle, 2017). The Blockchain also allows for
transactions to be non-duplicable and non-immutable meaning that accuracy and precision are of
chief concern (Bauerle, 2017). With a currency that lacks the security infrastructure akin to a
bank which has private account numbers, solid security infrastructure, and holds physical
reserves in the event you wanted to withdraw from your bank account, the nature of
cryptocurrencies can be scary for individuals who would prefer security knowing their funds
(cryptocurrencies) are secured (Golman, 2018). Privacy and anonymity are chief concerns of
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cryptocurrency users and thus, cryptocurrencies have a blockchain network and a strong mining
process to self-sustain and protect its infrastructure and currency network.
Cryptocurrencies are perhaps most sought after most due to the overall inability for
foreign entities to trace funds and the low cost, efficient transactions that occur as a result.
Transactions that use cryptocurrencies as currency are almost done simultaneously as you don’t
need any credit/debit card information and just need your cryptocurrency wallet available which
has no cost associated with it. The amount will credit to the recipient within a few seconds
making the ease of transfers quick and desirable unlike today’s banking world where charges
remain pending and can take several business days to post (Martucci, 2017). There really are no
third parties and low transaction costs, thus maximizing the efficiency of a transaction for both
the consumer and seller. When looking at repressive countries, if citizens run afoul of their
governments, these governments can freeze or seize their assets, domestic bank accounts, or
reverse transactions made in local currency (Martucci, 2017). With the use of cryptocurrencies,
state seizures are theoretically impossible due to cryptocurrencies enhanced security features and
cryptocurrencies being stored in the cloud, not being physical assets. This ultimately benefits
consumers in countries ruled by repressive regimes like Venezuela in which their financial
property and assets are susceptible to government confiscation or seizure (Graham, 2017).
Cryptocurrencies also are generally cheaper than traditional electronic transactions
(Martucci, 2017). Cryptocurrencies security features like block chains, private keys, and wallets,
as discussed earlier, solve problems like double spending, fraud and overall transparency. These
features allow for cryptocurrencies to be more cost-efficient for consumers as they allow for
cheaper transaction costs, minimize the use of third parties (like Visa or PayPal which charge 13% transaction fees) for payment authentication, verification, and processing. The use of
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cryptocurrencies eliminates these transaction fees as cryptocurrency miners bear the burden of
the fee and are rewarded by potential new cryptocurrency units (Martucci, 2017). International
transactions have also been significantly cost effective due to the low barriers and low costs of
international transactions as theoretically there is no difference between parties domestically and
internationally (Martucci, 2017). With international transactions involving fiat currency like the
Venezuelan Bolivar, there exists special transaction fees including direct international money
transfers, international credit cards, ATM fees, custom fees, and exchange rates that negatively
affect your Purchasing power of money (Martucci, 2017). Cryptocurrencies are useful in this
way as they minimize the burden for consumers particularly Venezuelans who rely heavily on
imports and are thus discouraged from participating in the global economy due to exaggerated
exchange rates, currency controls, and price controls.
Cryptocurrencies clearly have multiple benefits that can aid individuals but there are
great consequences associated with them that certainly can deter or vex consumers.
Cryptocurrencies have a tendency to facilitate black market activity such as money laundering,
illegal drug purchases, human trafficking and other illicit activity (Martucci, 2017). While
cryptocurrencies are for the most part heavily unregulated, decentralized, and untracked as this is
perhaps the biggest appeal, the currency itself does participate as a means of exchange for
activity that is illicit, dangerous, and unethical which can bear a heavy burden on users using the
currency (Martucci, 2017). While this is a great moral and unethical issue, it should be noted that
other currencies such as the U.S. dollar, Venezuelan Bolivar, Japanese Yen, etc. are used for, in
some ways at least, fraudulent or illicit behavior.
Cryptocurrencies are also heavily used in cases of tax evasion because they aren’t
regulated by a governmental entity and aren’t functions of normal monetary theory from central
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authorities, as the stock and flow of currencies cannot be tracked (Martucci, 2017). Online
sellers, employers, and individuals all participate in cryptocurrency transactions to avoid sales
taxes, payroll taxes, income tax liabilities, and while the IRS applies the same taxation policies to
cryptocurrencies in the U.S., several other governments haven’t adapted to this level of intricacy
of tracking cryptocurrencies especially with pseudonyms and anonymity being used so heavily
(Martucci, 2017). In general application, it proves problematic particularly when diving into
deeper macroeconomic topics of taxation and fiscal policy that these cryptocurrencies can be
problematic. Further social contracts, infrastructure, and policy is needed to deter this issue.
Perhaps the greatest consequence of using cryptocurrencies is the possibility of the loss
of financial capital whether it be via hacking, theft, unreliable storage devices, or technical
glitches (Martucci, 2017). Because cryptocurrencies are stored in the cloud and on storage
devices like a flash drive or cell phone, there exists a risk of theft and hacking that is not seen
with common fiat currencies. On December 7, 2017, roughly $64 million worth of bitcoins was
hacked on CoinHash, one of the cryptocurrency exchanges (Iyenger, 2017). On January 28,
2018, a whopping $534 million worth of bitcoins was stolen again via one of the security
exchanges (Shepherd, 2018). With these tremendous losses, Bitcoin users whom lost their
cryptocurrencies are unable to retrieve their financial capital as can be done with large banks
with regular fiat currency.
Cryptocurrencies also lack the financial, technical, and capital infrastructure needed to be
used as a proper medium of exchange (Martucci, 2017). Very few websites and companies
accept cryptocurrencies as a medium exchange. A currency is only as useful as those willing to
accept and in return use it again as means of exchange. In the United States, the United States
Dollar is a successful currency partially due to the infrastructure established to accommodate
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such currency, a high frequency of usage, and a widespread acceptance of the individuals
agreeing via a social contract that this currency is a valuable medium of exchange worthy of use.
Cryptocurrencies lack both of these as the average store does not have the technological
infrastructure to accept bitcoin due to relative high fixed costs to adapt to such technology
(Martucci, 2017). Cryptocurrencies also lack widespread usage as they are facilitating greater
influxes of users but questions of cost efficiency remain. Currently only scattered large retailers,
various online platforms, and a few stores accepting cryptocurrencies as a medium of exchange.
Given this limiting factor, this thus inhibits the functionality of cryptocurrencies and in certain
circumstances make the currency impractical and inaccessible (Martucci, 2017). This could
propose a problem to Venezuelans who desperately need access to large, open markets at the
lowest cost possible.
The most discussed and widely known consequence of cryptocurrencies is the volatility
of cryptocurrencies. Volatility simply refers to the pricing behavior of securities and the
fluctuations that happen in the short run. Bitcoin, for example, is incredibly volatile as its price
per coin started at $1,000 in the beginning of 2017 and ended 2017 at an all-time high of
$19,843, an increase in value of more than 1300% (Kleinman, 2018). Despite this value
accumulation, Bitcoin continues to be susceptible to massive, almost dangerous, volatility. On
December 22, 2017, Bitcoin’s value fell sharply by 21% in a period of less than 24 hours, falling
from $15,561 to a low of $12,504 (Kleinman, 2018). On January 16, 2018, Bitcoin’s value
plunged by another 25% to $10,300 which is down 47% from December’s all-time high
(Kleinman, 2018). During 2013, its volatility was 3-4 time higher than that of a typical stock, and
its exchange rate with the U.S. dollar was about ten times more volatile than other currencies like
the euro or yen (Kleinman, 2018). This volatility isn’t just associated with Bitcoin as other
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crypto-assets like Ethereum, Litecoin, and Ripple all report similar fluctuations in asset value.
This type of volatility (both rapid increases and decreases) is due to news regarding security
breaches that worry investors, bad press affecting rate of adoption, a fluctuation in perceived
value, great uncertainty in the risk involved, significant variance in the perception of the method
of valuation, a variance in liquidity methods, and uncertain global growth (Martucci, 2017).
There exist arguments that translate this volatility toward that of a market bubble similar to the
“dot com” bubble of the late 1990s and early 2000s. Many argue that bitcoin is a bubble and that
it’s simply an overhyped phenomenon that is akin to a modern penny stock and one day it’s
going to burst just like the dot com bubble and so many bubbles before (Martucci, 2017).
The nature and characteristics of cryptocurrencies as a whole is in complete contrast with
the fiat currency system, which is a currency that a government in a particular country declares
as legal tender like the bolivar in Venezuela or the U.S. dollar in the United States. Most
organized and developed countries in the modern world have implemented and retain a fiat
currency system (Hall, 2015). Fiat money is based on the faith and credit of the economy and its
value is derived from the relationship between the monetary supply (typically under the control
of the central bank) and the demand for money. The most important component of the fiat
monetary system is that it gives central banks the ability to print or hold money thus affecting
monetary supply, interest rates, and general liquidity of assets thus giving central banks, like the
Federal Reserve, greater cushioning power to act in times of recession (Hall, 2015). The main
concern here is that this gives central banks perhaps too much power to affect inflation,
purchasing power of money, and the ability to completely obliterate the store of value feature of
fiat money despite the ability to enact expansionary monetary policy (either increasing the
monetary supply, lowering interest rates, or increasing aggregate demand) (Hall, 2015). The
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nature of cryptocurrencies particularly in Venezuela arises due to a severe fault in the fiat
currency, the Venezuelan bolivar. The severe fault being that the fiat currency was susceptible to
the populist economic policies implemented by the regimes of Chavez and Maduro resulting in a
shortage of resources, economic instability, a sharp 35% reduction in GDP over the past 5 years,
hyperinflation projected of around 2300%, and a purchasing power of money around zero. Thus,
leading to the emergence and proliferation of alternative currencies like cryptocurrencies in
Venezuela which were demanded by suffering individuals within the country who needed access
to larger, open markets as the current local markets failed to provide for their demands and basic
needs.
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Part III: The Viability of Cryptocurrencies
Currencies
Given the hyperinflationary crisis in Venezuela, the nature of cryptocurrencies
themselves, and rapid technological change within Venezuela, the question remains: are
cryptocurrencies viable alternative currencies during hyperinflationary periods (given that the
fiat currency, the Venezuelan bolivar, has clearly failed)? In order to facilitate this discussion,
one must look at the modern day definition of alternative currencies and money. Alternative
currencies are currencies which are not the national currency of a particular currency and thus
are not denoted as legal tender (Gross, 2014). The use of alternative currencies is based on a
social agreement between the buyer and the seller exchanging the currency. While most
alternative currencies consist of local currencies or various non-nationalized currencies,
cryptocurrencies fit this definition but due to their recent implementation, are these
cryptocurrencies viable alternative currencies in the sense that they meet the economic
conditions and definition of money that is typical current fiat money meet.
In terms of money, a currency needs to satisfy three key functions to properly fit the
economic definition. It first needs to act as a proper medium of exchange eliminating key issues
of a lack of double coincidence of wants and the divisibility problem. A good currency must be
demanded by the seller of a particular good while being socially agreed upon by the parties
participating in the exchange. The second function of money is that it needs to act as a store of
value meaning that a particular or asset will maintain its value over time especially during
inflationary (hyperinflationary) periods. This is arguably one of the more important aspects when
it comes to looking at cryptocurrencies in Venezuela particular due to the lack of the store of
value feature with the bolivar. The final function is that money needs to be act as a unit of
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account in the sense that it must be consistent in order to represent the real value of any
economic concept that can be quantifiable in terms of monetary value. This allows for proper
financial accounting and economic analysis which allows for meaning interpretation of prices,
costs, and profits.
William Jevons prompts the discussion on money and currency with his treatise on
Money and the Mechanism of Exchange (1875) defining functions of money and the properties
of money that best facilitate their functions. In Chapter V of his treatise, Jevons (1875) notes the
importance of the properties of money in furthering the functions of money with the key
properties being utility and value, portability, indestructibility, homogeneity, divisibility, stability
of value, and cognizability. Jevons (1875) notes that money takes on various functions amongst
various subjects and thus requires different but collective properties in order to take on the great
complexity of deciding the best material for money. For Jevons (1875), money should possess
value and have utility at the basis of value as money is only received in order to be used (either
in investment or consumption) in order to satisfy one’s own ends. Money should also be portable
and indestructible so that in can be transported to market with little to none transaction cost and
able to be passed in trade countlessly or kept on reserve indefinitely (Jevons, 1875).
Homogeneity and divisibility refer to the idea that money must be homogenous among its units
and also (while referring to precious metals divisible so that the size is proportional to its value.
A currency should finally be stability in its value and not subject to fluctuations and it should
also be widely recognizable, distinguishable, and be established as a character of certain money
of certain value (Jevons, 1875). While Jevons treatise of Money and the Mechanism of Exchange
(1875) was rudimentary and generally applicable to commodity money, its principles can be
applied in the debate of cryptocurrencies as alternative currency.’
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The Case for Cryptocurrencies
In his thesis of Economics of Bitcoin: Is Bitcoin an alternative to fit currencies and gold?
(2012), Surda argues that Bitcoin poses as a serious alterative to fiat currency and commodity
money like gold or silver and uses Mises’ regression theorem to state this claim. Mises’
regression theorem serves to explain how money achieves prices and that the origins of money
are a market phenomenon. Surda (2012) first looks at the origin of money and finds that
Bitcoin’s origin is in direct relation with that of Mises’ catallactic origin of money in that it was
demanded by individuals in the market who arguably were biased against fractional-reserve, fiat
money in the beginning of the great recession in 2008. Surda (2012) argues that bitcoin also
meets the functionality of a medium of exchange due to its emergence of empirical price in the
market as the rational expectations of the potential utility of bitcoin for potential buyers exceeded
the price demanded by the producers and thus with competition on the supply side, trade
emerged. Surda (2012) also argues that the emergence of liquidity also plays a role particularly
with the Bitcoin market which allows for cryptocurrency exchange which opened in February of
2010. Surda, as a whole, argues that bitcoin meets the medium of exchange function of money
due to bitcoins ability to have an emergence of price and an emergence of liquidity but argues
that it fails to meet the store of value and unit of account functionality. Surda (2012) notes that
bitcoin does have a comparative advantage over other mediums of exchange particularly fiat
money and gold due to little transaction costs and a very inelastic money supply curve. Surda
(2012) also states that due to the high volatility of bitcoin which is very much based on public
perception that the store of value function and unit of account function are incredibly difficult to
obtain at least in the early life of this new digital currency. Surda (2012) concludes his argument
by stating that hypothetically market forces have the potential to make the evolution of Bitcoin
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into meeting the proper functionality of money but that due to so much uncertainty, a high level
of specialization, and immature services, it just isn’t there yet.
Fred Ehrsam, from the America’s Quarterly (2015), argues that Bitcoin can empower
Latin American entrepreneurs to tap into a truly global market by permitting them to accept
payments from anywhere in the world without facing cross-border fees. Bitcoin bypasses the
frictions traditionally associated with sending money from one country to another which is
especially beneficial for entrepreneurship and remittance payments. This is particularly of
significant importance in Venezuela as 95% of exports are derived from oil production as
Venezuela imports roughly two-thirds of its food needs. Historically and currently,
cryptocurrencies are helping Venezuelans gain access to markets for which it cannot access with
its current currency as its current currency lacks any sort of purchasing power and fails to
function as a proper means of exchange in world markets.
Ehrsam (2015) also notes that in Latin America, 70% of the population own mobile
phones while only 40% have access to formal banking institutions or services thus with such a
large connected population, Bitcoin is the perfect candidate to gain a foothold over alternative
financial systems. Ehrsam (2015) states that in Latin America, all countries except Brazil have
larger unbanked than banked populations. This is a massive socio-economic problem as the
majority of individuals lack access to financial institutions and the current financial institutions
are not adequately incentivized to serve the unbanked population (Ehrsam, 2015). There is an
immediate, low-barrier solution and with cryptocurrencies anyone with internet access can
receive wages and maintain savings in a secure, digital Bitcoin account at a very low cost to the
user, and with no additional resources from local operators (Ehrsam, 2015). Bitcoins enable the
secure and global storage and transmission of money without a bank account or credit card and
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thus can be seen as a mechanism to catalyze financial inclusion of the historically unbanked
(Ehrsam, 2015).
Steve Patterson (2013), from the Foundation for Economic Education, also argues that
cryptocurrencies are viable currencies in the short run but that in the long run the propensity to
use any particular currency is rather unknown, not just for cryptocurrencies. Patterson (2013)
uses Gold and Silver, the world’s longest and perhaps most valuable currencies as examples and
places long term viability as a function of Jevon’s properties: cognizability, indestructibility,
portability, utility/value, homogeneity, divisibility, and stability of value. According to Patterson
(2013), Bitcoin meets the characteristics of portability, homogeneity, indestructibility as bitcoins
are digital and can be sent electronically instantaneously and are also divisible as one bitcoin can
be divided down to one hundred millionth of a bitcoin. The question that Patterson is struggling
with is the notion of stability of value as the limited supply as bitcoin has a limited supply of 21
million units but the nominal price of a bitcoin is constantly fluctuating perhaps due to the
market trying to adjust to speculators entering and leaving the market. Patterson (2013) cites this
as non-important as it’s clear the bitcoin has value and has so over several years despite the
volatility and thus serves as a proper monetary currency meeting the values and qualities of those
demanding it.
Jeffrey Tucker (2014), also from the Foundation for Economic Education, continues the
discussion and argues that bitcoin has all the best features of money from history but adds a
weightless and spaceless payment network that enables the entire world to trade. For Tucker
(2014), cryptocurrencies, in general, are changing the game as they are attracting those in
developing countries like Venezuela but also those in developed countries who have strong and
reliable currencies. Tucker cites Carl Menger to cite that currency emergence is a market
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phenomenon and that the value and price of money are retrieved based on the amount of goods
and services the particular currency can obtain. Money ultimately emerges as monetary
entrepreneurs seek out an ideal form of commodity for indirect exchange thus making money the
most marketable commodity. Tucker (2014) then looks at Mises’ regression theorem in defense
of value in bitcoin and notes that although Mises states that the initial value of money before it’s
a commodity is its direct utility, bitcoin is different because although bitcoin is nothing outside
of exchanges, it’s a currency and a payment system of significant value. For Tucker (2014),
cryptocurrencies use value comes from its relationship with its payment system (the blockchain)
as indicated in its first evaluation of 1309.03 bitcoin for $1 U.S. dollar on the day of its release in
January 2009. For this very reason, Bitcoin can be used and function as a means of exchange,
unit of account, and store of value.
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The Case Against Cryptocurrencies
While several economists and scholars believe that cryptocurrencies are viable alternative
currencies, many economists and academics don’t think cryptocurrencies have the capacity to act
as money. Jeffrey Dorfman (2017), cites that although Bitcoin has surged incredibly in the past
few years making a good case for currency substitution but that bitcoin acts more like an asset
than a currency. Dorfman (2017) notes that Bitcoin lacks two key characteristics to be able to be
defined as a currency. The first is that bitcoin lacks a proper store of value. The importance of
the store of value function of money cannot be understated due to a stable currency’s ability to
attract investment because those who invest are expecting a stream of future earnings to earn
back their investment plus some profit. Instability in currency means that investors cannot
accurately predict the value of those future earnings and thus make investments less valuable
making less investment occur. In 2017, the U.S. dollar’s exchange rate increased over the month
by about 3% while bitcoin’s exchange rate rose by 49% (Dorfman, 2017). In 2017, the U.S.
dollar’s exchange rate changed in a day by less than 1% while bitcoin’s exchange rate changed
by 3% (Dorfman, 2017). People don’t want investments or debts denominated in a currency
whose value can change by 50% in a month.
Jeffrey Dorfman (2017) also notes that the facilitation of transactions done by the
blockchain is another factor inhibiting the store of value component of bitcoin. Dorfman (2017)
notes that the general processing of bitcoin transactions is extremely slow and that due to a limit
on the number of transactions that can be completed in a day, it can take several days to
complete a transaction. Dorfman (2017) cites that its very security threatens its value in everyday
use and that given recent investments by speculators, it’s becoming more like a stock to earn a
profit off of with a hugely growing bubble. Dorfman (2017) does note the expansion of
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cryptocurrencies but states that any sort of currency adoption or expectation is rather
inconceivable.
Beliunas (2017) joins the discussion and also states that cryptocurrencies, particularly
bitcoin, cannot be successful currencies. Beliunas (2017) cites the three characteristics for a
successful currency; medium of exchange, store of value, and a unit of account and that Bitcoin
only really settles one and a half of these functions. In terms of medium of exchange, Bitcoin is
being accepted globally as money as large retailers, websites, and stores are gaining the
infrastructure and are accepting Bitcoin as payment. When looking at the unit of account
functionality, Beliunas (2017) notes that the volatility of bitcoin destroys any sort of real
economic value that can be placed on assets, liability, goods, or services. Further, lenders don’t
use bitcoin as a unit of account for things like credit, loans or mortgages thus eliminating any
sort of foundation for cryptocurrencies as a unit of account. The store of value function is where
bitcoins and other cryptocurrencies get tricky as bitcoin does meet this function but more in
terms of an asset like digital gold than as money. Beliunas (2017) looks at how valuable the asset
is becoming in high inflationary economics like Zimbabwe and Venezuela where demand for the
currency has skyrocketed and where consumers and businesses are demanding bitcoin for day to
day purchases. As a whole, Bitcoin, according to Beliunas (2017), does not met the functions of
a proper money and thus states that the future is quite unknown but that in terms of challenging
developed currencies like the US. Dollar or Euro, is a stretch.
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The Viability of Cryptocurrencies
The debate regarding the viability of cryptocurrencies is one that is emerged and
proliferated over the years since the first appearance and development of cryptocurrencies in the
late 2000s and early 2010s. The scholarly debate of cryptocurrency viability materializes
amongst economists and academics like Ehrsam, Tucker, Surda, Patterson, Dorfman, and
Beliunas particularly in terms of the cryptocurrency’s ability to meet the necessary
characteristics and functions of money.
The debate regarding the viability of cryptocurrencies as alternative currencies is quite
recent but much empirical work, time, and information is needed to understand where
cryptocurrencies are headed in the short and long run. Some economists like Tucker and
Patterson state that cryptocurrencies easily satisfy the three functions while economist Surda
states that they have the general potential to meet this definition in the long run but that in the
short run, as of current data, they fail to do so. Other scholars like Beliunas and Dorfman argues
that although cryptocurrencies are becoming used more so as a medium of exchange, they are
failing to meet the definitions of store of value and unit of account.
When it comes to Venezuela and the question of cryptocurrency viability, while the longterm viability remains a heated debate and topic of discussion, the viability issue is without a
doubt undisputed. Cryptocurrencies are introducing and providing a means for Venezuelans to
access goods in markets that Venezuelan bolivars cannot provide access to. Cryptocurrencies
like bitcoin, litecoin, ripples and others are providing real solutions to the economic crisis that is
plaguing the country of Venezuela. Cryptocurrencies might not be long term solutions but they
are, at least in the short run, acting as currencies with a medium of exchange, store of value, and
unit of account functionalities.
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Discussion and Conclusion:
In summary, the purpose if this thesis is to examine the origins, nature, and viability of
cryptocurrencies in the hyperinflated country of Venezuela. The origins of cryptocurrencies in
Venezuela relate directly to the macroeconomic and microeconomic policies set forth by the
Chavez and Maduro regimes. The first economic policy taken into consideration is Chavez’
restructuring of the Venezuelan economy which made the country susceptible to the Dutch
Disease and allowed for government revenues to act as a function of solely international oil
prices. The second economic policy taken into consideration is the redistributive land and wealth
policies which have driven away foreign direct investments like Pepsi and ExxonMobil and
destroyed the incentive system which allow individuals to trade and make society better off. The
third economic policy considered is the price controls implemented by Chavez and furthered by
Maduro which have distorted the pricing system and resulted in short-run shortages which have
hurt consumers and producers. The fourth economic policy taken into consideration is the
irresponsible government spending and monetary policy which lifted inflation to a projected
level of 2300% and ultimately hurt consumers’ purchasing power. The final economic policy
considered is the fixed exchange rate system set in place by Chavez which allows for very
limited exchanges to occur and extreme shortages to follow.
These economic policies contributed greatly to the current economic crisis and all
seriously hurt the Venezuelan fiat money, the Venezuelan bolivar, and thus allowed for
alternative currencies, like cryptocurrencies to emerge. Cryptocurrencies are decentralized,
digital assets that are designed to work as a medium of exchange which uses cryptography to
secure its transactions, control the creation of marginal units, and verify the transfer of these
assets. These cryptocurrencies are great in that they are have relatively low transaction cost,
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cannot be traced by a third party, and allow Venezuelans to have access to larger, more open
international markets for goods and services. Bitcoins in particular are providing Venezuelans
with access to markets like Amazon, Walmart and other companies that use Bitcoin as a medium
of exchange. John Villar notes that Bitcoins allow his family to easily import goods which he is
unable to do with the Venezuelan bolivar and others are seeing this same trend as roughly a
hundred thousand Venezuelans are using bitcoins as currency. Cryptocurrencies however require
lots of energy, are heavily used in tax evasion schemes, and are used in drug and human
trafficking cases regularly which could deter use and make the currency less effective.
This thesis concludes by discussing the feasibility of cryptocurrencies as alternative
currencies in the hyperinflated country of Venezuela. This scholarly debate materializes amongst
economists and academics in the early 2010s. Economists Ehrsam, Tucker, Patterson, and Surda
all argue that cryptocurrencies function as money in that they meet the three functions of money
(medium of exchange, store of value, and a unit of account). Tucker, Patterson, Ehrsam, and
Surda all note that cryptocurrencies meet the three functionalities of money as well as Jevons’
characteristics of money very well. Ehrsam also notes that Bitcoins are currencies which bypass
traditional barriers associated with fiat currencies and can help the traditionally unbanked in
Latin America. On the other hand, Dorfman and Beliunas note that cryptocurrencies do act as a
proper medium of exchange but due to major volatility and instability compared to other
currencies that these are merely assets and not currencies. Cryptocurrencies are introducing and
providing a means for Venezuelans to access goods in markets that Venezuelan bolivars cannot
provide access to. Cryptocurrencies like bitcoin, Litecoin, ripples and others are providing real
solutions to the economic crisis that is plaguing the country of Venezuela.

48

Bibliography:
Acheson, N. (2018, January 26). What is bitcoin? Retrieved February 17, 2018, from
https://www.coindesk.com/information/what-is-bitcoin/
Alchian, A. (2007, September). Property Rights. Retrieved February 11, 2018, from
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PropertyRights.html
Althauser, J. (2017, December 16). Adoption of Bitcoin Picking Up Speed in Venezuela,
Called "Lifesaving" Currency. Retrieved February 16, 2018, from
https://cointelegraph.com/news/adoption-of-bitcoin-picking-up-speed-in-venezuela-calledlifesaving-currency
Althauser, Joshua. “Venezuelan Bitcoin Miners Turning to Ethereum After Government
Crackdown.” Cointelegraph, 28 Aug. 2017, cointelegraph.com/news/venezuelan-bitcoin-minersturning-to-ethereum-after-government-crackdown.
Amadeo, K. (n.d.). Could You Survive Hyperinflation? Retrieved February 16, 2018,
from https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-hyperinflation-definition-causes-and-examples3306097
Armario, C., & Sanchez, F. (2017, December 14). Venezuelans facing currency crisis
turn to bitcoin to survive. Retrieved February 16, 2018, from
https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2017/1214/Venezuelans-facing-currency-crisisturn-to-bitcoin-to-survive
Armario, C., & Sanchez, F. (2017, December 13). Venezuelans seeing bitcoin boom as
survival, not speculation. Retrieved February 16, 2018, from
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/venezuelans-seeing-bitcoin-boom-as-survival-notspeculation/
Aru, L. (2017, February 13). Nigeria is Following Venezuela's Bitcoin Trend | Iyke Aru.
Retrieved February 17, 2018, from https://fee.org/articles/nigeria-is-following-venezuelasbitcoin-trend/
Bajpai, P. (2015, February 24). The Impact Of Venezuela's Bolivar Exchange Rates.
Retrieved February 11, 2018, from https://www.investopedia.com/articles/forex/022415/impactvenezuelas-bolivar-exchange-rates.asp
Bauerle, N. (2017, March 17). What is Blockchain Technology? Retrieved February 17,
2018, from https://www.coindesk.com/information/what-is-blockchain-technology/
Beliunas, L. (2017, November 16). Bitcoin Not Currency, Never Will Be: Expert Blog.
Retrieved February 18, 2018, from https://cointelegraph.com/news/bitcoin-not-currency-neverwill-be-expert-blog
Benzaquen, Mercy. “How Food in Venezuela Went From Subsidized to Scarce.” The
New York Times, The New York Times, 16 July
2017, www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/07/16/world/americas/venezuela-shortages.html.
49

C.W. (2014, November 05). What Dutch disease is, and why it's bad. Retrieved February
11, 2018, from https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/11/economistexplains-2
Choudhury, Saheli Roy. “Bitcoin Is Exploding in Venezuela — but Not for the Reason
You Think.” CNBC, CNBC, 24 Aug. 2017, www.cnbc.com/2017/08/24/bitcoin-mining-ispopular-in-venezuela-because-of-hyperinflation.html.
Chun, R. (2017, August 08). Big in Venezuela: Bitcoin Mining. Retrieved February 16,
2018, from https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/09/big-in-venezuela/534177/
Cove, R. (2017, November 20). How did Bitcoin come to be? Retrieved February 16,
2018, from https://marketrealist.com/2017/11/how-did-bitcoin-come-to-be
Desjardins, J. (2017, September 05). From Richer to Poorer: Venezuela's Economic
Tragedy Visualized. Retrieved February 10, 2018, from http://money.visualcapitalist.com/richerpoorer-venezuela-economic-tragedy/
Disilvestro, E., & Howden, D. (2015, December 28). Venezuela's Bizarre System of
Exchange Rates. Retrieved February 14, 2018, from https://mises.org/library/venezuelas-bizarresystem-exchange-rates
Dorfman, J. (2017, May 17). Bitcoin Is An Asset, Not A Currency. Retrieved February
18, 2018, from https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffreydorfman/2017/05/17/bitcoin-is-an-asset-nota-currency/#3055e3ac2e5b
Dornbusch, Rudiger, and Sebastian Edwards. The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin
America. National Bureau of Economic Research, 1989.
Durden, T. (2017, November 28). Valuing Bitcoin Using Metcalfe's Law. Retrieved
February 16, 2018, from https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-11-28/bitcoins-valuation-usingmetcalfes-law
Durden, T. (2017, October). This Is What The Death Of A Nation Looks Like: Venezuela
Prepares For 2,300% Hyperinflation. Retrieved February 11, 2018, from
https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-10-10/what-death-nation-looks-venezuela-prepares-2300
Edwards, Sebastian. Crisis and Reform in Latin America: from Despair to Hope. Oxford
University Press, 1999.
Ehrsam, F. (2015). Is Bitcoin Latin America's Next Big Thing? Retrieved February 17,
2018, from http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/bitcoin-latin-americas-next-big-thing
Ellsworth, B. (2014, January 24). Venezuela decrees new price controls to fight inflation.
Retrieved February 11, 2018, from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuelaeconomy/venezuela-decrees-new-price-controls-to-fight-inflation-idUSBREA0N1GL20140124
England, C. (2016, November 28). Venezuelas currency now worth so little shopkeepers
weigh vast piles of notes instead of counting them. Retrieved February 16, 2018, from
50

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/venezuelas-currency-hyper-inflation-oilcrisis-devalued-shop-keepers-weigh-notes-a7443596.html
Fahey, M., & Wells, N. (2016, November 20). Blame it on Caracas: Why these S&P 500
giants are suffering from a Venezuelan hangover. Retrieved February 11, 2018, from
https://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/16/venezuelas-crashing-economy-has-an-effect-on-us-corporateearnings.html?view=story&%24DEVICE%24=native-android-mobile
Friedman, Uri. “How Populism Helped Wreck Venezuela.” The Atlantic, Atlantic Media
Company, 4 June 2017, www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/06/venezuelapopulism-fail/525321/.
Gillespie, P. (2017, November 22). Venezuela inflation soars to 4,000% in death spiral.
Retrieved February 16, 2018, from http://money.cnn.com/2017/11/22/news/economy/venezuelacurrency-crash/index.html
Gillespie, Patrick. “Venezuela Just Defaulted, Moving Deeper into Crisis.” CNNMoney,
Cable News Network, 14 Nov. 2017, money.cnn.com/2017/11/14/news/economy/venezueladebt-default-sp/index.html.
Gillespie, P. (2017, July 27). Venezuelans scramble for food, but it's often out of reach.
Retrieved February 11, 2018, from http://money.cnn.com/2017/07/27/news/economy/venezuelafood-shortage/index.html
Golman, E. (2018, January 11). Cryptocurrency and Blockchain Explained Two
Cryptocurrencies to Watch in 2018. Retrieved February 17, 2018, from
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/cryptocurrency-and-blockchain-explained-twocryptocurrencies_us_5a5515bde4b0cd114bdb36e3
Graham, L. (2017, April 24). Venezuela's asset seizures raises concerns for other sectors.
Retrieved February 17, 2018, from https://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/24/venezuela-asset-seizuresraise-concerns-for-other-sectors-gm.html
Graham, L. (2017, February 20). Venezuela's crisis causes its people to cut meals and
lose weight. Retrieved February 10, 2018, from https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/20/venezuelascrisis-cause-its-people-to-cut-meals-and-lose-weight.html
Gross, J. (2014, October 30). 10 alternative currencies, from Bitcoin to BerkShares to
sweat to laundry detergent. Retrieved February 18, 2018, from https://blog.ted.com/10alternative-currencies-from-bitcoin-to-berkshares-to-sweat-to-laundry-detergent/
Hackett, R. (2017, October 2). IMF Head: Cryptocurrency Could Be the Future. Really.
Retrieved February 17, 2018, from http://fortune.com/2017/10/02/bitcoin-ethereumcryptocurrency-imf-christine-lagarde/
Hall, J. (2015, December 06). Fiat Currency: What It Is and Why It's Better Than a Gold
Standard. Retrieved February 17, 2018, from

51

https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2015/12/06/fiat-currency-what-it-is-and-why-its-betterthan-a.aspx
Hanson, S., & Alvarez, C. (22009, February 09). Venezuela's Oil-Based Economy.
Retrieved February 11, 2018, from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/venezuelas-oil-basedeconomy
Hausmann, R. (2017, July 31). Venezuela's Unprecedented Collapse . Retrieved February
10, 2018, from https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/venezuela-unprecedentedeconomic-collapse-by-ricardo-hausmann-2017-07?barrier=accessreg
Heath, H. (2016, June 15). Venezuela's Case of Dutch Disease: Cursed by Oil. Retrieved
February 11, 2018, from http://www.panoramas.pitt.edu/economy-and-technology/venezuelascase-dutch-disease-cursed-oil
How Cryptocurrency is Disrupting the Global Economy. (2018, January 10). Retrieved
February 10, 2018, from https://medium.com/the-mission/how-cryptocurrency-is-disrupting-theglobal-economy-89347581aa93
International Property Rights Index2017. (n.d.). Retrieved February 11, 2018, from
https://www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/country/venezuela-bolivarian-republic-of
Iyenger, R. (2017, December 08). NiceHash: More than $70 million stolen in bitcoin
hack. Retrieved February 17, 2018, from
http://money.cnn.com/2017/12/07/technology/nicehash-bitcoin-theft-hacking/index.html
Jevons, W. (1875). Money and the Mechanism of Exchange. New York, NY: Appleton
and Co. .
Kleinman, J. (2018, January 17). Why Bitcoin's Price Is So Volatile. Retrieved February
17, 2018, from https://lifehacker.com/why-bitcoin-s-price-is-so-volatile-1822143846
Krauss, C., Casey, N., & Vlasic, B. (2017, April 20). Amid Venezuela Protests, G.M.
Plant Is Seized, and Company Exits. Retrieved February 11, 2018, from
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/20/business/venezuela-general-motors-business-protests.html
Lieuwen, E., & McCoy, J. L. (2018, January 19). Venezuela. Retrieved February 10,
2018, from https://www.britannica.com/place/Venezuela/The-economy
Martucci, B. (2017). What Is Cryptocurrency – How It Works, History & Bitcoin
Alternatives. Retrieved February 16, 2018, from
https://www.moneycrashers.com/cryptocurrency-history-bitcoin-alternatives/
Navia, Patricio, and Andres Velasco. “The Politics of Second-Generation Reforms.”
Institute for International Economics, 2013.
Nino, J. (2016, August 17). Price Controls Are Disastrous for Venezuela, and
Everywhere Else. Retrieved February 11, 2018, from https://mises.org/blog/price-controls-aredisastrous-venezuela-and-everywhere-else
52

Patterson, S. (2013, December 11). Is Bitcoin a Viable Currency? Retrieved February 18,
2018, from https://fee.org/articles/is-bitcoin-a-viable-currency/
Pollock, Darryn. “Venezuelans Are Surviving In Crisis By Mining Bitcoin.”
Cointelegraph, 24 Aug. 2017, cointelegraph.com/news/venezuelans-are-surviving-in-crisis-bymining-bitcoin.
Rands, Kevin. “Why Venezuela's Currency Crisis Is A Case Study For Bitcoin.” Forbes,
Forbes Magazine, 3 Feb. 2017, www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2017/02/03/why-venezuelascurrency-crisis-is-a-case-study-for-bitcoin/#61fcc90619b2.
Rodríguez, F. (2018, January 12). Why More Sanctions Won't Help Venezuela. Retrieved
February 16, 2018, from http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/12/why-more-sanctions-wont-helpvenezuela/
Schwartz, E. (2016, July 12). The Dutch Disease in Saudi Arabia and Venezuela.
Retrieved February 11, 2018, from https://econlife.com/2016/02/the-dutch-disease-that-saudiarabia-and-venezuela-share/
Schwartz, J. D. (2008, December 14). Alternative Currencies Grow in Popularity.
Retrieved February 16, 2018, from
http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1865467,00.html
Shepherd S. (2018, January 30). Bitcoin Security Scrutinized After $534 Million Stolen.
Retrieved February 17, 2018, from https://securitytoday.com/articles/2018/01/30/bitcoinsecurity-scrutinized-after-534-million-stolen.aspx
Simoes, A. (2018). The Observatory of Economic Complexity: Venezuela. Retrieved
February 10, 2018, from https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/ven/
Surda, P. (2012). Economics of Bitcoin: is Bitcoin an alternative to fiat currencies and
gold? Nakamoto Institute. Retrieved January 21, 2018, from
http://nakamotoinstitute.org/static/docs/economics-of-bitcoin.pdf
Taub, M. F. (2017, May 21). How Venezuela went from the richest economy in South
America to the brink of financial ruin. Retrieved February 10, 2018, from
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/long_reads/how-venezuela-went-from-the-richest-economyin-south-america-to-the-brink-of-financial-ruin-a7740616.html
TIMELINE-Hugo Chavez and Venezuela's oil industry. (2010, February 09). Retrieved
February 11, 2018, from https://www.reuters.com/article/venezuela-carabobo/timeline-hugochavez-and-venezuelas-oil-industry-idUSN0924439020100209
Tucker, J. A. (2014, August 27). What Gave Bitcoin Its Value?. Retrieved February 18,
2018, from https://fee.org/articles/what-gave-bitcoin-its-value/
Venezuela. (2017). Retrieved February 11, 2018, from
https://www.heritage.org/index/country/venezuela

53

Weisbrot, M., & Sandoval, L. (July 2007). The Venezuelan Economy in the Chavez
years. Center for Economic and Policy Research. Retrieved from
http://cepr.net/documents/publications/venezuela_2007_07.pdf
Young, J. (2017, October 17). Demand For Bitcoin in Venezuela is Increasing at an
Exponential Rate. Retrieved February 16, 2018, from
https://www.newsbtc.com/2017/10/17/demand-bitcoin-venezuela-increasing-exponential-rate/
Zuñiga, Mariana. “Bitcoin ‘Mining’ Is Big Business in Venezuela, but the Government
Wants to Shut It Down.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 10 Mar.
2017, www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/03/10/bitcoin-mining-is-bigbusiness-in-venezuela-but-the-government-wants-to-shut-it-down/?utm_term=.a85ecb994095.

54

